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ABSTRACT 
 This paper introduces a new measure of management overconfidence, overconfident tone, 
and shows its association with excess investments, larger share repurchases, and higher stock 
portions in CEO compensations. Overconfident tone is composed of abnormal positivity and 
abnormal certainty. They are calculated by dividing conference call transcripts into management 
parts and analyst parts, and separately analyzing tones using Loughran-McDonald (2011) 
Dictionary for corporate documents. The results are consistent with previous literature on CEO 
overconfidence, with overconfident tone associated with excess investment and larger share 
repurchase. We also test abnormal positivity and abnormal certainty with CEO’s exposure to firm-
specific risk to confirm the viability of overconfident tone as a new measure of management 
overconfidence. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Textual analysis in accounting allows researchers and investors to look deeper into hidden 
cues of corporate information. Previous literature analyzes linguistic complexity, sentiment, and 
even CEO’s voice to understand more about management traits and behaviors. Using the tools 
available through the development of textual analysis, this paper aims to introduce a new measure 
of management overconfidence: overconfident tone. Using conference call transcripts, we 
calculate abnormal positive tone and abnormal certain tone of management, and test the 
association between them and corporate decisions such as investments and share repurchases. 
 CEO overconfidence has two major aspects: over-optimism and miscalibration. Over-
optimistic managers overestimate the returns on their investments, and believe themselves to be 
“better-than-average.” Miscalibration refers to managers underestimating the uncertainties 
surrounding their firms. Abnormal positivity and abnormal certainty as measured in this paper 
each tackle the two major aspects of management overconfidence. Managers who speak more 
positively and with higher certainty are likely to be more confident.  
 By using conference call transcripts, this paper identifies abnormal tones. Since conference 
call transcripts include words from both managers and analysts at the same time and setting, we 
can calculate the difference of tones between the two. Distributions of abnormal positive tone and 
abnormal certain tone show that in general, most managers speak more positively and with greater 
certainty than analysts.  
 Regression analysis illustrates the relation between overconfident tone and excess 
investment. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns on their future investments, and are 
therefore inclined to make more investments compared to their peers. This paper also shows that 
overconfident tone is statistically significantly associated with larger share repurchases and larger 
 
 
stock portions of CEO compensation. These empirical results support overconfident tone as a 
viable measure of management overconfidence. 
 The findings contribute to the management overconfidence literature by proposing a new 
measure of management overconfidence utilizing tone analysis. This paper also contributes to the 
literature on textual analysis in accounting by providing empirical evidence that management tone 
is associated with real corporate decisions. 
 
II. RELATED LITERATURE 
Management Overconfidence 
 There is extensive literature on management overconfidence in both finance and 
accounting. Management overconfidence is characterized to have two major aspects: over-
optimism and miscalibration (Libby and Rennekamp 2011). Over-optimism overestimates the 
returns on future investments, and previous studies relate it to the better-than-average effect of 
social psychology. Miscalibration refers to underestimating the uncertainties related to a 
manager’s firm. Previous literature focuses on how this management trait affects corporate policies 
and reporting behavior. 
 Malmendier and Tate (2005a) is one of the earliest paper to connect management 
overconfidence with investment decisions. They show that overconfident managers overestimate 
the returns on their investments and believe that external funds are excessively expensive. They 
measure CEO overconfidence by calculating CEOs’ personal exposures to company-specific risk 
through their holdings of stock options. Using a similar measure of overconfidence, Malmendier, 
Tate, and Yan (2011) show that overconfident managers prefer to finance projects with internal 
funds and prefer debt over equity. Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) also observe that 
overconfident managers invest more, use more debt, pay fewer dividends, repurchase more stock, 
 
 
and use more long-term debt. Another measure of overconfidence is presented in Malmendier and 
Tate (2005b), and this measure captures how press portrays managers. They compare the number 
of articles in which a manager is described as confident or optimistic with the number of articles 
that describe the manager as not confident or not optimistic. Using both option-based and press-
based measure of overconfidence, Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2010) show that overconfident 
CEOs invest more in innovation and gain more patents.  
 Prior studies also research the relation between management overconfidence and reporting 
behavior. Schrand and Zechman (2011) show that overconfidence is likely to lead to initial 
misreporting from optimistic bias, which then snowballs into intentional misreporting in the future. 
Other paper demonstrate that management overconfidence is associated with a higher likelihood 
of issuing management forecast, a higher level of optimism in the forecasts, and a lower precision 
of the forecasts (Libby and Rennekamp 2011; Hribar and Yang 2016). Ahmed and Duellman (2012) 
observe evidence of a significant negative association between overconfidence and accounting 
conservatism. 
 
Textual Analysis in Accounting 
 Previous research on management overconfidence uses two main measures of 
overconfidence: a CEO’s holding of stock options and press portrayal of the CEO. This paper 
suggests a new measure of management overconfidence which is measured through observing 
abnormal positive tone and abnormal certain tone from conference calls. Related to the methods 
used in this paper, there is an emerging literature on textual analysis in accounting and tone 
management. 
 
 
 Loughran and McDonald (2011) created a new word lists for financial documents, 
improving from Harvard Psychological Dictionary, which they show to be not as accurate when 
analyzing the tone of corporate documents. Based on an extensive sample of 10-Ks, they compiled 
negative, positive, uncertain, litigious, strong modal, and weak modal word lists that are widely 
used in measuring sentiments of texts. Other research focuses on the readability or complexity of 
financial documents. Firms with complex financial statements are more likely to make voluntary 
disclosures to supplement their complex reports (Guay, Samuels, and Taylor 2016). Bushee, Gow, 
and Taylor (2017) divide linguistic complexity into two conflicting components: information and 
obfuscation. They show that the information component of complexity is negatively associated 
with information asymmetry, while the obfuscation component is positively associated with 
information asymmetry. 
 Other literature connects disclosure tone with firm fundamentals. Firms being sued are 
shown to use more optimistic tone in their earnings announcements (Rogers, Van Buskirk, and 
Zechman 2011). Huang, Teoh, and Zhang (2014) find that managers generally use tone 
management to mislead investors regarding firm values.  
 The bag-of-words method is one of the most widely used methods in textual analysis in 
accounting (Loughran and McDonald 2016). The bag-of-words method uses a pre-specified lists 
of words that are related to certain sentiments, and the frequency of words in the lists are used to 
measure the tone. For instance, Rogers, Van Buskirk, and Zechman (2011) use a pre-defined list 
of optimistic words to gauge optimistic tone, and Huang et al. (2014) use lists of positive words 
and negative words to measure tone management. Literature on linguistic complexity uses a 
readability index such as the Fog Index, which is a function of sentence length and frequency of 
complex words.  
 
 
 
Accounting Management and Real Activities 
 There is important an literature that connects accounting management and real corporate 
decisions. McNicholas and Stubben (2008) demonstrate that firms that engage in earnings 
management are more likely to make suboptimal investment decisions. They test and show that 
earnings management can also influence internal decisions as well as investors’ perception of the 
company. Zang (2012) documents a substitutive relation between accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation. Managers trade-off between real activities 
manipulation and accrual-based earnings management depending on the costs associated with each 
method. 
 
III. HYPOTHESES 
 This paper aims to reaffirm the relation between management overconfidence and 
corporate decisions by introducing a novel measure of management overconfidence measured 
through managements’ abnormal tones. Previously used measures of CEO overconfidence are 
CEOs’ holding of stock options and press’ portrayal of the CEOs (Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 
Malmendier and Tate 2005b). CEO overconfidence quantified by these existing measures are 
shown to be associated with excess investment, larger stock repurchases, preference on long-term 
debt, and so forth (Malmendier et al. 2011, Ben-David et al. 2007, Hirshleifer et al. 2010). We 
introduce abnormal positivity and abnormal certainty as new measures of management 
overconfidence, and test the association between the new measure and corporate policies.  
 Among corporate decisions, we test if investments and share repurchases are related with 
overconfidence. Overconfident managers are likely to overestimate the returns on their future 
 
 
investments, and therefore are more likely to make excess investments. Miscalibration, another 
facet of overconfidence, leads managers to underestimate the uncertainties related to the future 
projects. Overconfident managers also believe their stocks to are undervalued. Therefore, we 
expect to see positive correlation between management overconfidence and share repurchases. Our 
main are as follows: 
 
H1-a: Managers’ abnormal positive tone is associated with excess investments. 
H1-b: Managers’ abnormal certain tone is associated with excess investments. 
H2-a: Manager’s abnormal positive tone is associated with larger share repurchases. 
H2-b: Manager’s abnormal certain tone is associated with larger share repurchases. 
 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Overconfident Tone as a Measure of Management Overconfidence 
 This paper introduces overconfident tone as a new method of quantifying CEO 
overconfidence. By directly observing the tone of management in conference calls, we can 
quantify management’s confidence at a certain time. We expect that managers who speak more 
positively and with more certainty are likely to be more confident about a firm’s conditions and 
prospects. Conducting textual analysis on conference call transcripts, we measure abnormal 
positivity and abnormal certainty of management to measure management overconfidence. 
 This paper divides conference call transcripts into management parts and analyst parts to 
calculate managements’ abnormal tone. We use analysts’ tones as a benchmark, and see how 
managers’ tones differ from them. This research setting from Bushee et al. (2017) provides an 
adequate environment to observe management overconfidence. In every conference call, managers 
 
 
and analysts are discussing the same firm at the same time. This allows us to measure 
overconfidence more specifically and accurately. Analysts do not have incentives to speak more 
or less positively and with more or less certainty about companies in conference calls, providing 
us with a good benchmark. This unique feature of overconfident tone allows us to better identify 
management confidence in excess of the benchmark. Moreover, since overconfident tone can be 
measured for every conference call, we can measure CEO overconfidence at a specific year or 
quarter, or observe variations across time.  
 We measure tones using the bag-of-words methods using the Loughran-McDonald 
Dictionary (2011) for corporate documents. Namely, we use L-M Negative word list, L-M Strong 
Modal word list, L-M Weak Modal word list, and L-M Uncertainty word list in our model. The 
formulas for abnormal positive tone and abnormal certain tone for firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡 are described 
below. 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑡 −  𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
where 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐿𝑀 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝐿𝑀 𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
 ×  (−1) 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
where 
𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖,𝑡
=
𝐿𝑀 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝐿𝑀 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑀 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑀 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
  
 
 
 
We use the L-M Negative word list when capturing positive tone instead of the L-M Positive word 
list for better accuracy. Positive words are easily negated inside sentences, making positive word 
lists a noisy dictionary to use when measuring optimism in texts.  
 
Measuring Excess Investments 
 This paper intends to reaffirm the association between overconfidence and excess 
investment using management abnormal tone. Our primary measure of excess investment are 
capital expenditures after controlling for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) Industry 
Group, size, and profitability. Size is measured as total assets, and profitability as earnings before 
interest and tax over total revenue.  
 We use a second model of investment to confirm that we are truly capturing excess 
investments over investment opportunities. One could plausibly argue that there could be cases 
where managers are overconfident because their firms have better investment opportunities 
compared to their peers. A widely used model of investment explains the level of investment as a 
function of Q ratio and cash flows:  
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1, or Tobin’s Q of firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡 − 1, represents investment opportunities and 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 
captures the firm’s ability to realize the opportunities. This paper runs an additional test on the 
relation between overconfident tone and investments after controlling for Tobin’s Q, cash flows, 
and GICS Industry Groups. 
 
Data 
 
 
 Managements’ and analysts’ tones are analyzed from conference call transcripts of S&P 
500 firms from 2013 to 2015 (1,556 firm years). Conference call transcripts are collected from 
Thomson Reuter Streetevents. Word lists and dictionaries used to measure tones are from 
Loughran-McDonald Dictionary (2011). Firm annual fundamentals and market values are 
collected from Compustat. Data on management compensation is available from ISS (formerly 
RiskMetrics).  
 
Empirical Procedures 
 This paper conducts four tests, first two directly testing the main hypotheses and the last 
two supporting and reinforcing the results from the first two tests. First, we test H1-a and H1-b to 
show the association between overconfident tone and excess investments controlling for size, 
profitability, growth, and industry group fixed effects. Since tones are collected from fiscal year-
end conference calls, we use next year’s investments as the dependent variable. 
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 1: 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 refers to firms’ total assets, and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is calculated as earnings before income and 
tax divided by total revenue.  
 Secondly, we test H2-a and H2-b to examine the relation between overconfident tone and 
stock repurchases. The control variables are the same as those in Test 1.  
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 2: 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
 In Test 3, we test H1-a and H1-b using different controls to identify excess investments. In 
this test, we control for Tobin’s Q and cash flows. Tobin’s Q (𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄) is calculated as (Market 
Value of Equity – Book Value of Equity + Total Assets) / Total Assets, and cash flows (𝐶𝐹) as 
sum of net operating cash flow and net financing cash flow. Tobin’s Q captures the investment 
opportunities a firm has and cash flow measures the firm’s ability to fund the investments. 
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 3: 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 Test 4 serves to validate overconfident tone as a measure of management overconfidence. 
We test the association between overconfident tone and the stock portion of management 
compensation to show that abnormal positivity and abnormal certainty are associated with CEO’s 
exposure to firm-specific risk, which is a commonly used measure of CEO overconfidence. We 
expect CEO compensation packages to be similar within industry groups; therefore, the excess 
stock portion of compensation relative to the peers can be used as a proxy of CEOs’ exposure to 
idiosyncratic risk. 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘%𝑖,𝑡 is calculated as stock compensation divided by total compensation 
of CEO of firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡. 
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 4: 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘%𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
V. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The summary statistics of the independent and dependent variables of our research model 
are shown in Table 1. The means and lowest quartiles of both 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦  and 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  are positive values, showing that in general, managers speak more 
 
 
positively and with more certainty compared to analysts at conference calls. This is an empirical 
evidence that managers are managing their tone, to sound more confident.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Dependent Variables 
        
 mean std min 25% 50% 75% max 
Abn_Pos 0.0046 0.0043 -0.0102 0.0019 0.0046 0.0071 0.0184 
Abn_Cert 0.6152 0.2163 -0.0328 0.4687 0.6139 0.7564 1.2250 
Size 59300.35 198713.0 383.90 6961.73 15743.00 39946.00 2573126.0 
Profitability 0.1748 0.2466 -4.0597 0.1093 0.1698 0.2544 0.7046 
Growth 0.0936 0.1561 0.0000 0.0198 0.0384 0.0803 1.3925 
TobinQ 2.259 1.581 0.621 1.325 1.802 2.562 20.923 
CF 2146.58 5704.29 -89375.00 268.24 850.00 2329.85 63550.00 
INV 1280.06 2875.81 0.00 128.00 368.00 1199.00 35407.00 
Repurchase 1094.41 2508.48 0.00 29.83 332.38 1057.90 45000.00 
Stock% 0.4338 0.2279 0.0000 0.2807 0.4445 0.5941 1.0000 
 
Primary Results 
 Table 2 summarizes the OLS regression results of Test 1. The results show that abnormal 
positivity and abnormal certainty are associated with higher investments controlling for size, 
profitability, growth, and industry fixed effects at the 5% significance level. The results are 
consistent with previous literature that show an association between CEO overconfidence and 
excess investment.  
 The results for Test 2 are presented in Table 3. Controlling for size, profitability, growth, 
and industry fixed effects, abnormal positive tone is statistically significantly associated with 
larger stock repurchases. Overconfident managers believe their shares to be undervalued, and 
therefore more likely to repurchase shares. 
 In Test 3, we use a different model of investment to ensure that we are actually capturing 
excess investments in Test 1. A widely used model of investments describe investments as a 
function of investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q) and cash flows. Results of Test 3 show that 
 
 
abnormal positivity and abnormal certainty are statistically significantly associated with excess 
investments after controlling for Tobin’s Q, cash flows, and industry group (Table 4). This is 
another empirical evidence that overconfident tone is related with excess investments. 
 Table 5 contains results of Test 4, which tests the association between overconfident tone 
and the stock portion of manager’s total compensation. One of the previously used measures of 
CEO overconfidence is CEOs’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk. We expect the compensation 
packages to be similar within an industry, and a higher stock portion of total compensation relative 
to peers to signal greater CEO exposure to firm-specific risks. Results show that abnormal 
positivity and abnormal certainty are both associated with a higher stock portion in CEO 
compensation. This result supports overconfident tone as a new measure of management 
overconfidence. 
 The results show that overconfident tone is associated with excess investments, larger share 
repurchases, and CEOs’ stock portions of total compensations. The evidence supports that 
abnormal positive tone and abnormal certain tone can be used as measures of management 
overconfidence.  
 However, overconfident tone as proposed in this paper relies on a potentially problematic 
assumption that analysts’ tones are accurate benchmarks of an appropriate level of managers’ 
positivity and certainty. Due to information asymmetry, we expect managers to know best about 
firms’ conditions and prospects. Therefore, our assumption could be criticized on the basis that 
some managers could have overconfident tone, solely because they know better than the analysts, 
when the internal information is positive and promising. However, we saw from the descriptive 
statistics of 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦  and 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  that in general managers speak 
more positively and with greater certainty compared to analysts. This can be interpreted as 
 
 
evidence of widespread practice of tone management. With CEOs managing their tones to show 
higher confidence, it is hard to say that managers’ tones are more accurate compared to the analysts’ 
tones. We believe that analysts have no incentive to deviate their tone from a normal level, and 
therefore use their tones as a benchmark. 
  
 
 
 
Table 2: OLS Regression Results of Test 1 (Dep. Variable: INV) 
     
 coef std err t P > |t| 
Const -910.4901 2247.563 -0.405 0.685 
Abn_Pos 5.069e+04 1.63e+04 3.105*** 0.002 
Abn_Cert 872.2353 338.500 2.577** 0.010 
Size 0.0049 0.001 8.197*** 0.000 
Profitability 566.5657 356.356 1.590 0.112 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The results are controlled for industry fixed effects. 
 
 
Table 3: OLS Regression Results of Test 2 (Dep. Variable: Repurchase) 
     
 coef std err t P > |t| 
Const -621.9980 1620.204 -0.384 0.701 
Abn_Pos 4.528e+04 1.19e+04 3.797*** 0.000 
Abn_Cert 300.8975 246.627 1.220 0.223 
Size 0.0043 0.000 10.497*** 0.000 
Profitability 776.1977 258.020 3.008*** 0.003 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The results are controlled for industry fixed effects. 
 
 
Table 4: OLS Regression Results of Test 3 (Dep. Variable: INV) 
     
 coef std err t P > |t| 
Const -504.7593 2188.151 -0.231 0.818 
Abn_Pos 7.203e+04 1.72e+04 4.191*** 0.000 
Abn_Cert 787.2058 346.730 2.270** 0.023 
TobinQ -126.9358 58.446 -2.172** 0.030 
CF 0.2493 0.015 16.510*** 0.000 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The results are controlled for industry fixed effects. 
 
 
Table 5: OLS Regression Results of Test 4 (Dep. Variable: Stock%) 
     
 coef std err t P > |t| 
Const 0.6556 0.212 3.099*** 0.002 
Abn_Pos 2.9263 1.311 2.232** 0.026 
Abn_Cert 0.0779 0.027 2.912*** 0.004 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The results are controlled for industry fixed effects. 
 
 
  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 This paper suggests new measures of management overconfidence, abnormal positive tone 
and abnormal certain tone, and shows that they are associated with excess investments, larger share 
repurchases, and higher stock portions of CEO compensations. Abnormal positivity and abnormal 
certainty are calculated by dividing conference call transcripts into management parts and analyst 
parts, and separately analyzing tones using Loughran-McDonald (2011) Dictionary for corporate 
documents. The results are consistent with previous literature on CEO overconfidence, with 
overconfident tone being associated with excess investments and larger share repurchases. We also 
tested abnormal positivity and abnormal certainty with CEO’s exposure to firm-specific risk to 
confirm the viability of overconfident tone as a new measure of management overconfidence. 
 The findings are strongly consistent with our hypotheses that overconfident tone is related 
to excess investments and larger share repurchases. Along with additional tests, we provide 
evidence that management abnormal tone can be used to capture and measure management 
overconfidence.  
 This research contributes to the management overconfidence literature by introducing a 
new measure of management overconfidence. Overconfident tone can be a more direct and time-
specific measure of management overconfidence. This paper also contributes to the literature on 
textual analysis in accounting by demonstrating that management tone is associated with corporate 
policies. 
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